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Abstract: We examine the effects that hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games 
has on macroeconomic outcomes in a panel of 184 countries spanning the period 
1950-2006.   Actual   hosting   of   the   Games   generates   positive   investment, 
consumption, and output responses before, during, and after hosting. We detect 
anticipation   effects:   (i)   bidding   for   the   Olympic   Games   generates   positive 
investment, consumption, and output responses at the time of the bidding; (ii) 
bidding for the Games has a transitory level effect. We confirm the presence of 
legacy effects: hosting the Games has a permanent level effect.
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According to Herodotus
1 during Xerxes' early days in Greece when the Olympics were on, Xerxes and 
Mardonius asked the prize for the Olympic winners to a group of Greek deserters. The answer was “An 
olive-wreath." Then Tigranes, one of Xerxes´s generals, uttered: “Good heavens! Mardonius, what 
manner of men are these against whom you have brought us to fight – men who contend with one 
another, not for money, but for honor!” 
Contemporary economists have no clear answer on whether the organization of the modern 
Olympic Games is a matter of honor. Although the acquirement of international prestige is obvious, the 
economic advantages for hosting the Games are not that clear. The economic benefits of hosting the 
Games are incredulous to most academics that have conducted independent research on the issue (see, 
for example Owen (2005)). Only recently, Rose and Spiegel (2011), using a variety of trade models, 
show that hosting the Olympics has a positive impact on national exports which is statistically robust, 
permanent, and large. Surprisingly, they also find that unsuccessful bids to host the Olympics have a 
similar positive impact on exports. Rose and Spiegel (2011) explain this finding by claiming that what 
actually matters is the signal countries send to international markets when they bid for the Olympics 
rather than the hosting of the Olympics itself. However, as they also recognize, their explanation cannot 
fit all aspects of the data. For instance, they cannot explain why open countries should bid to host the 
Olympics, and why countries bid repeatedly for the organization of such event. Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) start from the supposition that hosting a mega event provides visibility to a host country and, 
thus, may stimulate global demand for its exports. The starting point of our research is different. We 
argue that the bidding for hosting mega events creates anticipation effects for demand changes that 
stimulate current output, consumption and investment. In other words, the bidding for a mega event is 
translated to “news” about future investment opportunities and surges in public spending and private 
agents react to the news signal before the event happens.
In fact, we view the competition for the Olympic Games hosting as a natural experiment to test 
for anticipation effects in macroeconomic time series. This is because of the special bidding process 
followed for the hosting of the Olympics: the Olympic bidding process begins with the submission of a 
city's application to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by its National Olympic Committee 
(NOC). In most of the organized Games, the process has consisted of two phases. During the first 
phase, which starts after the bid submission deadline, approximately seven years before the actual 
organization of the event, the candidate countries compete for a favorite appraisal from the IOC 
1  Herodotus (Book 8, Urania, 26, 1).Evaluation Commission. In the second phase, a host city is selected four years before the actual 
organization of the events and the successful bid delegation signs the "Host City Contract" with the 
IOC, which delegates the responsibilities of the Games organization to the city and respective NOC. 
The election of the host city is made by the assembled active IOC members each possessing one vote. 
Members from countries that have a city taking part in the election cannot vote while the city is in the 
running. 
Hence, agents in candidate cities/countries receive signals for possible changes in aggregate 
demand seven to ten and four years before the actual organization of the Games. The first signal is less 
informative than the second one. It gives a 25% probability to the bidding country for holding the event 
in seven years, while the second signal is very informative and delivers news for changes in fiscal 
policy and demand in the host country in a four year horizon. Hence, we can test whether such news 
affect economic behavior and explicitly examine the role of expectations in forming macroeconomic 
outcomes. To the best of our knowledge our study is the first attempt in the literature to investigate 
directly if agents react in anticipation of future events with macroeconomic data.
Anticipation is a general concept used and applied in various domains. Economists have tried to 
study the effects of several types of economic news to macroeconomic variables. For example, Frenkel 
(1981), Engel and Frankel (1984) and Hardouvelis (1987) have looked at the response of interest rates 
to the news embodied in the weekly money supply announcements. Hardouvelis (1988) and Gürkaynak 
et al. (2005a and 2005b) examine how exchange and interest rates, and long term forward rates respond 
primarily to monetary news, but also to unexpected components of variables that reflect the state of the 
business cycle. Bartolini et al. (2008) explore how the release of new economic data affects asset prices 
in the stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. 
In macroeconomics it is often argued that changes in expectations are an important driving force 
of the business cycle. Beaudry and Portier (2006) show that the joint behavior of stock prices and TFP 
in the US favors a view of business cycles driven largely by a shock that represents news about future 
technological opportunities which is captured in stock prices. Beaudry and Portier (2007) and 
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose models that can explain how macroeconomic variables react to 
news about future total factor productivity. Ramey (2011) emphasizes the importance of measuring 
anticipations in fiscal shocks and in a recent working paper, Ramey (2009) constructs series of 
expected discounted value of government spending changes due to foreign political events by reading 
periodicals in order to approximate changes in expectations for public spending in defense in the US. 
However, all the above mentioned studies are based on time series information and do not make use of 
a clear episode exogenous to the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates that are known in advance such as the organization of the Olympic Games to measure anticipations in investment decisions and 
fiscal policy, rendering our analysis unique in the existing literature. 
To test for anticipation in the announcement of Olympic “news” we use a quasi-natural 
experiment approach in a panel of 184 countries spanning the period 1950-2006. To that end, we 
regress per capita GDP, consumption, investment, government expenditures, the price level and the 
exchange rate growth rates on an Olympic Games indicator variable. We apply rigorous panel data 
fixed effects estimation techniques that allow for contemporaneous, future, and lagged effects of the 
Games. 
The Olympic Games are economically beneficial, but not for their legacy effects in the host 
country, neither for the “honor” they incur. They are beneficial because of the positive effects they 
induce on expectations of private agents about changes in future demand. The hosting of the Games 
generates positive investment, consumption, and output responses before, during, and after its 
realization. Anticipation effects are present in all the variables we consider: GDP growth increases 
significantly during the previous 5 years before hosting and the peak response occurs when the winner 
of the bidding is announced, 4 years before the actual hosting of the event. The reason for this 
significant increase in GDP per capita growth is a significant positive and quantitatively large increase 
in private investment and consumption. Both variables increase consecutively and significantly 5 years 
before hosting with the maximum response occurring at the time of the announcement of the Olympic 
Games winner city. Also, government spending increases 4 years in advance of the actual event. The 
variable that mostly reflects the anticipatory demand effects of the Games is prices and the exchange 
rate that react significantly when a country bids for the Olympics reaching their maximum reaction 
around the time when the announcement of the winner is made.
Anticipation effects justify the increases in output growth of unsuccessful bidders: forward 
looking investors should boost investment demand in countries that bid for the Olympics since in those 
countries expected profits increase in the face of anticipated increases in demand. We show that this is 
the case in the data: we observe significant positive output growth, private investment, and private 
consumption responses in the bidding countries about seven to ten years before the actual hosting of the 
Games. Private investment significantly decreases two and three years after the unsuccessful bidding 
indicating that the investment projects undertaken while bidding are mostly reversible and for that 
reason the after-effects of bidding for the Olympic Games are significantly negative.
When we turn to the after-effects of hosting the Olympic Games in successful bidders we find 
that they are of relatively minor importance when compared to the before and contemporaneous effects, 
justifying findings of previous authors on the negligible economic benefits associated with the organization of mega events. 
Our results survive a series of sensitivity analyses concerning data treatment, sample periods 
and omitted variables controls. To check further the robustness of our findings we conduct a number of 
different experiments. First, we compare the organization of the Olympics with other mega events such 
as the International Expo and the World Cup. Both events confirm the presence of anticipation effects, 
but their effects are not comparable with the ones of the Olympics. Countries that have hosted 
International Expos experienced a significant increase in their real per capita GDP growth before the 
hosting of the event, but this effect was smaller compared to the one generated by the Olympics and not 
long lasting. The hosting of the World Cup Competition on the other hand generates negative effects on 
output, consumption and investment growth and only positive effects on government spending growth 
indicating that markets do not perceive the organization of such an event as a great investment 
opportunity, but as a means for the government to increase spending that crowds out private demand. 
We have, also, investigated whether local effects are stronger than country effects by repeating our 
analysis for regional data in the US. The regional analysis confirms the aggregate findings: hosting the 
Olympics generates positive output growth effects before, on impact, and after the event. Finally, stock 
price data confirm the presence of anticipatory effects. The stock price index increases significantly 
eight and nine years before the hosting of the Games in both hosting and bidding countries and the 
magnitude of the anticipatory increase in stock prices is comparable in the two group of countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the estimation 
methodology. In section 3 we present the main results. Section 4 examines the sensitivity of the results 
to changes in the econometric model and the natural experiment performed. The last section concludes. 
2. Data and Estimation
We obtain data on the bidding and hosting countries of the Olympic Games from www.olympic.org. 
We consider both winter and summer Games to increase the number of observations in the sample. Our 
data on real per capita GDP, private consumption, private investment, government expenditures, the 
consumer price level, and the nominal exchange rate are from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 
2009). Data Appendix Table 1 provides a list of the bidding and hosting countries and Data Appendix 
Table 2 provides some summary statistics on the macroeconomic outcome variables. 
We consider the bidding and hosting of the Olympic Games as natural experiments in the sense 
that their hosting is exogenous to current output and investment growth. Of course, the Olympic Games 
are different in nature than natural disasters such as earthquakes or floods. However, due to the particularity of the bidding process (that takes place many years in advance before the actual hosting of 
the Games) the incidence of the Olympic Games represents an event that is exogenous to the current 
state of the economy. 
We use the following econometric model to estimate the contemporaneous, future, and lagged 
effects of the Games:
(1)  Yi,t = a0Hosti,t  + A(L)Hosti,t  +B(F)Hosti,t +c0Bidi,t  + C(L)Bidi,t  +D(F)Bidi,t +αi+βt +ei,t 
where Hosti,t is an indicator variable that is unity in country i and year t if the country hosted in year t 
the Olympic Games. Bidi,t is an indicator variable that is unity in country i and year t if the country was 
bidding to host the Olympic Games that were held in year t. Because bidding to host the Olympic 
Games takes place about seven to ten years before the actual hosting of the Games, we include up to 
ten leads of the bidding and hosting country indicator variable on the right-hand side of the estimating 
equation, such that B(F) = b1F + b2F2 + ... + b10F10 and D(F) = d1F + d2F2+ ... + d10F10. The 
coefficients in the polynomial B(F) and D(F) hence capture the before-effects of the hosting and the 
bidding for the Olympic Games. Similarly, we examine the after-effects of the Olympic Games by 
including up to ten lags on the right-hand side of the estimating equation, such that  A(L) = a1L 
+a2L2+ ... + a10L10 and C(L) = c1L +c2L2+ ... + c10L10. The contemporaneous effects of the Olympic 
Games for the bidding and hosting countries are in turn captured by the coefficients a0  and c0. We 
examine whether bidding and hosting the Olympics has long-run (i.e. permanent) effects on the 
outcome variables Yi,t  by testing whether the sum of the estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous, 
after and before effects is significantly different from zero. 
Note that as control variables in equation (1) we have included country fixed effects αi  and year 
fixed effects βt. The country fixed effects are an important control variable because they account for 
time-invariant country specific unobservables that may affect the likelihood of hosting and bidding for 
the Olympic Games and the outcome variable of interest Yi,t. Hence, any fixed factors such as climate, 
continent, or language are controlled for with the inclusion of the country fixed effects. The year fixed 
effects are important because they account for year-specific common factors, such as for example the 
world business cycle. Because we control for both country and year fixed effects our estimated slope 
coefficients can be interpreted as a result of a difference-in-difference estimation.  
Our outcome variables of interest – real per capita GDP, consumption, investment, government 
expenditures, the price level, and the exchange rate – are highly persistent (see Data Appendix Table 2). 
We therefore include these variables in first-differences in the estimating equation. We account for 
serial correlation in the error term ec,t by using Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level. 3. Main Results
3.1. The Hosting Country
Table 1 reports our estimates of the contemporaneous and before-effects of hosting the Olympic 
Games. Column (1) shows that countries which hosted the Olympic Games experienced a significant 
increase in their real per capita GDP growth up to five years before the organization of the actual event. 
The peak effect occurs about four years prior to hosting. Note that this is the time when the uncertainty 
is resolved and competing countries learn with probability one whether the event will actually 
materialize in their territory. The estimated coefficient implies that at peak real per capita GDP growth 
increases by up to three percentage points. In the year when the Olympic Games are hosted GDP per 
capita growth is also significantly higher (relative to periods when the Olympics are not hosted) by 
around 1.8 percentage points. 
Column (2) of Table 1 shows that the reason for this significant increase in GDP per capita 
growth is a significant positive and quantitatively large increase in private investment. The peak 
investment effect coincides with the peak output effect and the time of the announcement of the 
Olympic bids winner. Investment responses are still significantly different from zero at the time of the 
actual hosting of the Games. Columns (3) and (4) show that also private consumption and government 
expenditures significantly increase before the conduct of the Games and they react more strongly to the 
news when these become certain four years before the actual event. 
We also find a significant positive effect of the hosting of the Olympic Games on the consumer 
price index and the nominal exchange rate. The estimates in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1 show that 
there is already a significant positive response in consumer prices and the exchange rate about 7 years 
before the actual hosting of the Olympic Games.
2 And, the peak response occurs at about five years 
before the actual hosting of the Games. Hence, while both prices and quantities react positively to the 
positive exogenous demand shock, the timing is such that the change in prices occurs before the change 
in quantities.
Table 2 examines whether hosting the Olympic Games has significant ex post growth effects. 
Columns (1) and (3) show that the effects on output and consumption are positive up to six years after 
the hosting of the Olympic Games. After six years the growth responses turn negative in sign, but they 
are statistically insignificant. For private investment, the lagged effects of the Olympic Games are 
negative in sign already one year after the actual hosting of the Games. Statistically they are 
insignificant at the 95 percent level. Also, for government expenditures, the consumer price index, and 
2 Note that the nominal exchange rate is defined as the ratio of home to US currency, so that an increase in the nominal 
exchange rate represents a depreciation of the home currency.the nominal exchange rate the after-effects of hosting the Olympics are quantitatively small and 
statistically insignificant. Table 2 therefore shows that the after-effects of hosting the Games are of 
relatively minor importance when compared to the before and contemporaneous effects.
The results in Table 2 might justify the findings of many academics (see Owen (2005)) that 
support that the economic benefits of organizing mega events such as the Olympic Games are 
quantitatively and economically small. Our analysis stresses that the benefits from organizing such 
events are non tangible, in the sense that they do not primarily concern the contemporaneous and after 
effects of the hosting. Similarly with Rose and Spiegel (2011) we point to positive effects that have to 
do with the signal the Olympics carry with them. For Rose and Spiegel (2011) the Olympics carry a 
signal of trade liberalization;  we show that there is more than that in this story: the news about 
increased investment opportunities that the organization of the Olympics implies create quantitatively 
significant anticipation effects. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to bring such evidence in 
light using macroeconomic time series.
3.2. The Bidding Countries 
If anticipation effects are present before the announcement of the Olympic Games country winner, such 
anticipation effects should also arise in the other bidding countries. Our estimation framework allows 
us to analyze the growth effects of bidding for the Olympic Games. During the 1950-2006, the bidding 
for the Olympic Games took place about seven to ten years before the actual hosting.
3 If our theory is 
correct, from an investor's point of view there is an expected increase in profits because in expectation 
output demand will be higher. It therefore makes sense, for reasonable parameter values of risk 
aversion, adjustment costs, and forward looking behavior to prop up investment in the country that bids 
for the Olympic Games. 
Table 3 shows that indeed output growth, private investment, and private consumption 
significantly increase during the period that countries bid for the Olympics. In particular, Table 3 shows 
that there is a significant positive output growth, private investment, and private consumption response 
in the bidding countries about seven to ten years before the actual hosting of the Games. Private 
investment responds first, while output and consumption react with one period lag relative to 
investment to the bidding news. 
Differently from the case of the winners, we observe no significant response in government 
expenditures. This seems to indicate that governments react to the news about the organization of the 
3 See e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bids_for_Olympic_Games Games once such news become certain. In Table 1 we have seen that governments reacted to the news 
only during the period when the winner of the bidding is announced. The fact that the governments of 
the bidders do not react to the bidding news indicates that governments in our sample typically do not 
spend resources on the organization of the Games unless they know with certainty that their investment 
projects will serve some certain scope. 
Table 3 provides us with another interesting piece of information: in the bidding countries (that 
did not win the hosting of the Olympic Games) private investment decreases after the announcement of 
the host winner and significantly so two and three years after this announcement. Hence, while during 
the time of the bidding private investment significantly increases, these investment projects are 
reversed once it becomes clear that the country is not going to host the Games. This unwinding of 
investment projects is also resonated by the estimates in Table 4 that show that the after-effects of 
bidding for the Olympic Games are negative, and for some lags statistically significant. This evidence 
suggests that most of the investment initiated with the possibly good news generated by the 
participation of a country to the bidding for the Olympics is reversible investment. Moreover, the time 
pattern confirms the presence of significant capital adjustment costs that deter the quick adjustment of 
investment projects to the revelation of the uncertainty.
3.3 Legacy Effects
Olympic Games are often associated with a long-term legacy effect. According to the supporters of the 
Games infrastructure investments lead to improvements in overall production conditions for domestic 
and foreign enterprises, making investment more attractive and increasing GDP per capita in the long 
run. We can examine whether the hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games had a long-run effect on 
the level of GDP per capita and the other outcome variables of interest. We do this by summing up the 
estimated coefficients, and test whether their sum is significantly different from zero. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that for the hosting countries the sum of the estimated coefficients for 
the GDP per capita, private consumption, and private investment response are positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 90 percent level. For the hosting countries the Olympic Games were hence 
associated with permanently higher levels of GDP per capita, private investment, and private 
consumption. On the other hand, Panel B of Table 5 shows that for the bidding countries there were no 
long-run effects. The sum of the estimated coefficients is quantitatively small and statistically it is not 
significant at any of the conventional confidence levels. In Panel C we test for a significant difference 
between the long-run effects of the Olympic Games in the host countries and the bidding countries. Our main finding is that for GDP per capita, private investment, and private consumption we can reject with 
over 95 percent confidence that the long-run effects are the same in the host and the bidding countries. 
Table 6 also shows that these results continue to hold when controlling on the right-hand side of the 
estimating equation for lags and leads of the dependent variable. In sum, we therefore find that there 
are significant long-run effects on the level of GDP per capita, consumption, and investment in the 
countries that hosted the Olympics while in the countries that bid for the Olympics the effects were 
only of transitory nature.
Our findings, thus,  explain  the urge of modern cities for winning the organization of the 
Olympic Games and their repeated attempts to win the Olympic bid.  The benefits even for bidding for 
the Olympics in terms of output and investment, although short-lived are significant. As for the gains of 
actually winning the bid we find that they are significant and are maximized when the announcement of 
the winner of the bid is made. Hence, we can justify the absence of evidence for positive effects of 
hosting the Games, since none of the previous studies in the literature has considered the positive 
effects that anticipation induces on macroeconomic outcomes.
In the next section we discuss the sensitivity of our results to modifications in the assumptions 
and the nature of the experiment. 
4. Sensitivity Analysis
4.1 The Nature of the Experiment
We started by assuming that the hosting/bidding for the Olympics is a natural experiment. An important 
issue in our empirical analysis is whether such event can be thought of as randomly assigned across 
country-years. If this assignment is indeed random, then we have a natural experiment in hand to 
examine the causal effects that an exogenous anticipated demand shock has on the macroeconomy. 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) which is responsible for making the decision of 
which country will host the Olympic Games states that: "only rich countries have the means to make a 
good return on such a large investment [the Olympic Games]." In the cross-section of countries, the 
random assignment assumption is indeed questionable since only countries which are sufficiently 
developed have the capacity of hosting the Games. However, note that in our estimation framework this 
concern does not apply because all our regressions control for country fixed effects. In fact, when we 
run regression (1) excluding developing countries the results we obtain are very similar.
Another way to check the randomness of the assignment is to examine whether within-country 
changes in GDP per capita growth are significantly related to the likelihood of hosting or bidding for the Olympic Games. We do this by estimating a conditional logit fixed effects model that has as the 
dependent variable the hosting and bidding country indicator variable and as the explanatory variable 
current and lagged within-country changes in GDP per capita growth. The results presented in Table 7 
indicate that the within-country changes in GDP per capita growth do not significantly predict the 
hosting or bidding for the Olympic Games. In addition, since the hosting and bidding for the Olympic 
Games is associated with positive demand effects reverse causality bias implies that the logit estimates 
are upward biased. That is, the logit estimates are likely to constitute an upper bound for the true 
average effect that GDP per capita growth has on the likelihood of hosting or bidding for the Games. 
Since the estimated coefficients on GDP per capita growth are positive but statistically insignificant, 
the conditional logit estimates provide reassuring evidence that it is unlikely that there are systematic 
positive reverse effects of GDP per capita growth on the likelihood of hosting or bidding for the 
Olympic Games.
As a further identification check, we test whether the ex ante coefficients for the hosting and 
bidding countries are identical. The p-values on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are identical 
are reported in Table 8. For the bidding countries, there is a positive expected demand effect at the time 
of the bidding. But, once the host country is announced the effect in the host country should be larger 
than the effect in the bidding country. This is indeed what the p-values in Table 8 show. The 
coefficients that reflect the effect of the Olympic Games on output growth, investment, and private 
consumption two to five years before the actual taking place of the Games are significantly larger in the 
host countries than in the bidding countries. From a theoretical point of view, these significant 
differences are in line with the predictions from forward looking macro-models. From an econometric 
point of view, they show that our results go through when we use the plausibly random decision of the 
Olympic committee of selecting the host country to identify the economic effects of hosting the 
Olympic Games.
Finally, note that the timing in regression (1) implies that shifting the time-series of the contem-
poraneous effect 8 years forward captures the actual bidding for the Olympic Games. This means that 
in order for there to be a reverse causality problem regarding the contemporaneous effects of hosting 
the Olympic Games the bidding in t-8 must systematically be a function of growth in period t. For this 
to be true two conditions need to be fulfilled: (i) that countries very accurately forecast growth eight 
years ahead, and (ii) that countries base their bidding decisions on these future growth forecasts. We 
believe that both conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled in reality; and indeed the insignificant logit 
fixed effects estimates in Table 7 resonate this.4.2 Cross-Country Parameter Heterogeneity
In Section 3 we found that the announcement of the Olympic Games winner generates positive 
investment, private and government consumption and output responses. An interesting question that we 
can examine with our panel data approach is whether the marginal effect of hosting the Olympic 
Games varies across countries as a function of government size, trade openness, political institutions, 
or geography. These variables have been found to be significant determinants of economic growth in 
the cross-section of countries and it is therefore interesting to examine with our panel data approach 
whether these variables also induce significant heterogeneity in the marginal effect that hosting the 
Olympic Games has on output growth.
Table 9 presents the results from an interaction model where the marginal effect of the Olympic 
Games is allowed to vary across countries. With the exception of political corruption we find that the 
interaction estimates are statistically insignificant. Since we do not have a precise theory to guide us on 
the sign or the significance of the interactions it is hard to elaborate on these results. Nevertheless, the 
significant negative interaction between the hosting of the Olympic Games and cross-country 
differences in political corruption appears coherent since in countries with high levels of corruption the 
uncertainty regarding the future effects of the Olympics on private demand might discourage investors 
from reacting positively to the Olympic news. Along these lines, in the political economy literature, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Bardhan (1997), among others, point to significant economic costs 
associated with excessive political corruption.
4.3 Other Mega-Events
4.3.1 International/World Expositions
An event very similar to the organization of the Olympics is the hosting of International Expositions. 
Although the character of the two events is very different the structure followed for competing for 
winning the hosting of the events is similar. The government of the country wishing to organize an 
Expo submits its candidacy application to the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE). In the case 
of World Expos, the candidacy application must be submitted a maximum of nine years and a minimum 
of six years before the proposed opening date of the exhibition. In the case of International Expos, the 
candidacy application must be submitted a maximum of six years and a minimum of five years before 
the proposed opening date of the exhibition. Beginning on the date that the first candidacy application 
is submitted to the BIE, any other government wishing to organize an exhibition for the same year has 
six months to submit its own candidacy application to the BIE. At the end of the six-month period the competition between the bidding countries begins. During the bidding phase, candidate countries carry 
out international campaigns to gain support for the project and develop their proposed themes in order 
to raise international interest around the proposed Expos. International symposiums, forums, and other 
activities are organized by the candidates to this end. At the end of the bidding phase, a vote by secret 
ballot takes place at a BIE General Assembly to grant the right to host an Expo to a government for the 
chosen city and date. The voting takes place approximately four years before the actual organization of 
the event and winners have to receive the majority of the votes.
In Tables 10 and 11 we present the before, the contemporaneous, and the after effects of hosting 
International Expositions. In contrast to the Olympic Games, competition for hosting the International 
Expo is limited. For that reason we can only report estimates of the effects of the actual hosting of the 
International Expo. Consistent with our results for the Olympic Games, Table 10 shows that countries 
which hosted the International Expo experienced a significant increase in GDP per capita growth, 
consumption, and investment well before the actual taking place of the Expo. The patterns are 
somewhat different. GDP growth increases significantly in the hosting countries nine and six years 
before the actual organization of the event, while investment increases significantly on the tenth and 
third year and consumption the sixth year before the hosting. Prices react significantly nine years ahead 
of hosting and exchange rates display no significant anticipatory movements. 
In contrast with the organization of Olympics the organization of international expositions 
seems to have no long lived effects. Table 11 shows that the after effects of the Expo are mostly 
insignificant and turn significantly negative five years after hosting. In Table 12 we formally check 
whether the effects of hosting the Olympics are different from the effects of hosting the International 
Expo by including both International Expos and the Olympic hosting indicator variable in the 
distributed lag model and then test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are the same. 
Panel A reports the results on the null hypothesis that the before effects of hosting International Expos 
are the same as the before effects of hosting the Olympics; Panel B reports the results on the null 
hypothesis that the contemporaneous effects of hosting the International Expo is the same as the 
contemporaneous effects of hosting the Olympics; and Panel C reports the results on the null 
hypothesis that the after effects of hosting the International Expo are the same as the after effects of 
hosting the Olympics. With the exception of the contemporaneous effect on private consumption, we 
cannot reject in any of these cases that the effects of hosting the Olympics are different from the effects 
of hosting International Expositions.4.3.2 The World Cup
Apart from the Olympics another mega athletic event is the FIFA World Cup. The two events share a 
lot of similarities: the World Cup takes place every four years, the competing countries make their bids 
approximately six to eight years before hosting and the winner of the bids is announced four years be-
fore the actual organization of the event. Using the same methodology we have used for the case of the 
Olympics we can examine whether the organization of the FIFA World Cup entails similar anticipatory 
and ex post effects as the organization of the Olympics.
4 Two observations are in place before present-
ing our results. First, the number of realized events when considering the World Cup is much smaller 
than the number of events when considering the Olympics, or International expositions.  Fourteen 
editions of the FIFA World Cup have been held during our sample period. This might raise a problem in 
our estimation since it reduces the variance of the explanatory variable. Second, competition to host the 
World Cup is limited in the sense that very often there were just two (or even one country) countries 
competing for the hosting of the event.  For example, Switzerland in 1954, Sweden in 1958, Germany 
in 1974, Argentina in 1978, Colombia in 1986, and Brazil in 2014 had no competitors bidding for the 
organization of the Cup. This lack of competition might affect our results and especially our estimates 
of anticipatory effects of bidding countries since in the case of the World Cup the number of these ob-
servations is very small. 
We present the results of the anticipatory effects of hosting the World Cup in Table 13. Similarly 
with the Olympics, the organization of the World Cup entails anticipatory actions from the part of both 
the private and the public sectors, but contrary to the Olympics these anticipatory effects are 
significantly negative in their majority. The ex ante effects on output, investment and consumption 
growth are negative. Output growth is reduced significantly three and one year before the event, while 
investment growth is significantly and substantially negative one year before hosting. The estimates in 
Table 13 indicate that investment growth decreases by 7.6 percentage points one year before the 
undertaking of the event while output´s maximal negative response is 1.7 percentage points. Private 
consumption growth is also decreasing in face of the hosting of the Cup, and its fall seems to be 
correlated   with   the   behavior   of   government   consumption.   Government   consumption   increases 
significantly ten years before hosting and continues to increase significantly up to six years before the 
Cup is hosted. Comparing the numbers in Table 1 with those of Table 13, we see that the ex ante surge 
in public demand in the two events is not comparable. Government spending increases by a maximum 
of 1.8 percentage points in the case of the Olympics 3 years before the organization of the event, while 
4   Including both the World Cup and the Olympic indicators in the same regression changes results little since the two 
events are mostly uncorrelated. We do not present the results of this regression here for economy of space.government spending increases between 2.6 and 3.5 points ten to six years before the Cup is 
materialized. This surge in public consumption seems to crowd out private consumption and 
significantly so, five years before the World Cup. The effects of the government´s expansion are 
reflected in the price of the exchange rate, while no significant effects on prices are detected.
The after effects of the World Cup are not that inauspicious. They are insignificant for almost all 
variables but output and investment growth. Output growth decreases significantly by 2.1 percentage 
points in countries that have hosted the Cup relative to countries that they haven´t. At the same time 
investment growth is reduced in these countries by 7.8 percentage points. 
When we turn to the effects of bidding for the World Cup the before effects are also negative 
but much smaller in size and relatively less significant. Output and investment growth reduce 
significantly during the bidding period, but this fall is not combined by  an  anticipatory surge in 
government consumption. The after effects are also negative but relatively smaller in size and not as 
significant as the after effects of the hosting countries.
All in all, besides the differences in the sign of the responses the evidence for the World Cup 
also suggests the presence of anticipatory behavior from part of both the private and the public sector. It 
seems that the hosting of the World Cup is not viewed in advance as an overall positive (private) 
investment opportunity, but as an occasion for the government to spend money with no positive returns 
for the private sector and this perception is verified even after the organization of the Cup. 
4.5 Regional Data
In the empirical models we have considered so far we have only used national data to evaluate the 
effects of the Olympics in the country hosting or bidding for the event. Some of the countries in our 
sample are quite large and the organization of a mega-event in one region can have positive spillover 
effects to other regions in that country. Hence, our results reflect country-wide average effects. To 
examine also regional effects of hosting the Olympics we turn to regional data for total real gross per 
capita state product for the US from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
5 The USA has hosted 5 Olympic 
Games in our sample: the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley in California, the 1980 Winter 
Olympics in Lake Placid in New York, the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles in California, the 
1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, the capital of the State of Georgia and the 2002 Winter Olympics in 
5  Ideally, we would like to perform the same exercise for European regional data for gross domestic product, but, such 
data are only available since 1995. Data prior to 1995 exist for some regions in Europe. However, in a communication 
we had with the Eurostat we have been informed that the regulation on national accounts has changed meaning that most 
of the data that Eurostat might have on regional GDP is not comparable prior to 95. Salt Lake City, the capital of Utah. 
We repeat our exercise in regression (1) by substituting countries for US states. The results are 
presented in Tables 17-18. According to Panel A of Table 17, hosting the Olympic Games generates 
increases in GSP growth three years before the actual hosting of the event. GSP growth also increases 
significantly the year before the winner´s announcement and decreases the year after the negative news 
are divulged in unsuccessful bidders, thus confirming the effects of anticipation in the regional data 
(see Panel B of Table 17). The after effects of hosting the Olympics are also considerable and last up to 
three years after the organization of the event. At the peak, US states that organized the Olympics saw 
their gross state product increase by more than 3.2 percentage points relative to states that did not 
undertake the organization of these events. In sum, besides the shorter sample, the regional data 
confirm the findings of the baseline analysis. The macroeconomy reacts in anticipation to news shocks 
about changes in future demand, such as the organization of the Olympics.
4.6 Anticipation and Stock prices
Many economists have shown that stock price movements reflect the market’s expectation of future 
developments in the economy (see e.g. Fama (1990) and Schwert (1990)). Given the nature of our 
exercise and its conclusions it is only natural to ask whether the anticipatory effects for the organization 
of the Olympic Games are reflected in the movements of the stock market. Using the IFS data on stock 
price indices for 30 countries in our sample between 1970 and 2006, we can test whether the Olympic 
bid has significant anticipatory effects on the evolution of stock prices of the hosting and bidding 
countries. We present the results of this regression in Table 19. The analysis of stock price data 
confirms our previous findings. The before effects of the Olympics on stock prices are positive and 
significant nine and eight years before the hosting of the events for both successful and unsuccessful 
bidders. The maximal responses of stock prices occur eight years before the organization of the 
Olympics in both groups of countries and the magnitude of the effect is comparable between groups. 
Relative to our previous findings, we are unable to detect significant positive effects on stock prices 
from the announcement of the bidding winner four years before the organization of the event. Stock 
prices move in the correct direction, in that the stock price index increases for the winner and decreases 
for   the   looser   of  the   bid,   however,   both   effects   are   not   statistically  significant.   Finally,   the 
contemporaneous effect of hosting the Games on stock prices is positive and significant indicating that 
markets perceive the organization of the event as a positive indicator of future profits.5. Conclusions
Starting from Pigou (1926) and Keynes (1936) until the recent work of Beaudry and Portier (2006, 
2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), economists have stressed the importance of expectations in 
determining the evolution of aggregate series. However, no empirical work exists that quantifies such 
effects and no studies have shown so far how the uncertainty about news affects aggregate 
macroeconomic outcomes in macroeconomic data. Most of the existing evidence for the presence of 
anticipation in macroeconomics is indirect. Anticipation effects present serious challenges to empirical 
research of the effects that economic policy has on the economy. Recent studies on the identification of 
fiscal shocks have shown that anticipation effects might be crucial for determining the effects of such 
shocks in the macroecocomy (see e.g. Ramey (2011) or Mertens and Ravn (2010)). 
By treating the hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games as a natural experiment we are able 
to quantify the effects of anticipatory behavior in macroeconomic aggregates. We find that such effects 
are economically important and statistically significant and they increase when the probability of the 
realization gets close to one. When we use the hosting of International Expos as a natural experiment, 
results are similar. The news about increases in future demand in both cases makes output and 
investment surge several years in advance of the actual event. Conversely, when we use the bidding and 
hosting for the World Cup as our experiment the sign of the anticipatory estimates is reversed. Agents 
do react in advance to the organization of the World Cup, but their reactions take the opposite direction 
and   except   from   government   spending   all   components   of   private   demand   decrease   with   the 
announcement of the hosting of the Cup.
Many studies have claimed that the economic advantages of hosting the Olympics are 
insignificant. Our results indicate that once one controls for the role of anticipation the impact of the 
Olympic Games on growth becomes statistically significant and economically important. We conclude 
that the hosting of the Olympic Games involves more benefits than an “olive wreath.” Our results 
justify the insistence of countries for undertaking the organization of the Games.References
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HostingCountry 0.018** 0.034** 0.015** 0.019* 0.023 -0.089*
(0.007) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.051)
F.HostingCountry 0.007 0.002 0.009* 0.016 -0.002 -0.047
(0.006) (0.022) (0.005) (0.014) (0.018) (0.057)
F2.HostingCountry 0.013** 0.026 0.017** 0.019* -0.001 -0.058
(0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.011) (0.030) (0.065)
F3.HostingCountry 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.020*** 0.004 0.022 -0.110*
(0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.059)
F4.HostingCountry 0.029*** 0.064*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.016 -0.094**
(0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.043)
F5.HostingCountry 0.020** 0.061** 0.021** 0.002 0.052** -0.110**
(0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.017) (0.026) (0.047)
F6.HostingCountry 0.005 0.019 0.003 0.010 0.049** -0.085**
(0.008) (0.026) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.036)
F7.HostingCountry 0.003 0.014 0.001 -0.003 0.033* -0.055*
(0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.009) (0.019) (0.029)
F8.HostingCountry 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.016 -0.012 -0.015
(0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035)
F9.HostingCountry 0.006 0.010 0.009* 0.006 -0.015 -0.005
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.021) (0.037)
F10.HostingCountry 0.008 0.026 0.001 0.006 -0.023* 0.016
(0.008) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.026)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











L.HostingCountry  0.003 -0.016 0.009 0.017 0.014 -0.056
(0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.015) (0.022) (0.041)
L2.HostingCountry  0.001 -0.024 0.008 0.006 -0.009 -0.026
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.051)
L3.HostingCountry  0.011 0.006 0.007 0.018 0.014 -0.043
(0.007) (0.020) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.048)
L4.HostingCountry  0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.049
(0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.042)
L5.HostingCountry  0.008 -0.011 0.010 0.005 -0.000 -0.046
(0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.059)
L6.HostingCountry  0.016*** 0.017 0.016** 0.003 -0.009 -0.015
(0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.044)
L7.HostingCountry  -0.010 -0.020 -0.008 -0.012 0.012 -0.064
(0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (0.066)
L8.HostingCountry  -0.008 -0.027 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 0.079
(0.011) (0.026) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.083)
L9.HostingCountry  -0.005 -0.013 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 0.200
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.196)
L10.HostingCountry  -0.008 -0.032* 0.000 -0.009 -0.011 -0.046
(0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.008) (0.019) (0.054)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











BiddingCountry 0.002 0.010 0.007 -0.003 0.024 -0.036
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.025)
F.BiddingCountry -0.004 -0.076* -0.010 0.043 -0.038 0.054
(0.005) (0.045) (0.006) (0.040) (0.029) (0.064)
F2.BiddingCountry -0.008 -0.031** -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008
(0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.034)
F3.BiddingCountry 0.001 -0.036 -0.007 0.036 -0.050 0.031
(0.004) (0.036) (0.007) (0.040) (0.037) (0.060)
F4.BiddingCountry 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.026 0.007
(0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.033)
F5.BiddingCountry -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 0.021 -0.049*
(0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029)
F6.BiddingCountry 0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.028* -0.056
(0.006) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.035)
F7.BiddingCountry 0.008** 0.028** 0.015*** -0.006 0.024* -0.070**
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.035)
F8.BiddingCountry 0.008*** 0.038*** 0.007* 0.006 0.021 -0.080*
(0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.041)
F9.BiddingCountry 0.011** 0.046** 0.007* 0.007 0.004 -0.047
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.042)
F10.BiddingCountry 0.008 0.047** 0.008 0.004 0.006 -0.030
(0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.027)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











L.BiddingCountry 0.004 0.040* 0.005 -0.019 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.022) (0.005) (0.021) (0.029) (0.024)
L2.BiddingCountry 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.029) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.041)
L3.BiddingCountry -0.000 0.034 -0.002 -0.020 0.030 -0.032
(0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.017) (0.023) (0.041)
L4.BiddingCountry -0.011 -0.033 -0.012** -0.014 0.002 0.020
(0.007) (0.026) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.047)
L5.BiddingCountry -0.009** -0.039*** -0.008* 0.001 -0.011 0.007
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.047)
L6.BiddingCountry -0.007 -0.025* -0.004 -0.001 -0.038*** 0.012
(0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.038)
L7.BiddingCountry -0.006 -0.023 -0.006 -0.010** -0.042 0.072*
(0.004) (0.018) (0.006) (0.004) (0.045) (0.040)
L8.BiddingCountry 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.040**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.017)
L9.BiddingCountry 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 0.027
(0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) (0.020)
L10.BiddingCountry -0.005 -0.018 -0.007 -0.003 0.010 0.024
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.004) (0.018) (0.030)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











Panel A: Hosting Country















Panel B. Bidding Country















Panel C. Difference Between Hosting Country and Bidding Country














Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values (reported in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 6. The Long-Run Effects of the Olympics











Panel A: Hosting Country















Panel B. Bidding Country















Panel C. Difference Between Hosting Country and Bidding Country














Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values (reported in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level. Additional control variables (not reported) are laggs and leads up to ten years of the dependent variable. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 7. The Effects of GDP Growth on the Likelihood of Hosting and Bidding for the Olympic Games























Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 6064 6064
Number of Countries 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood. Coefficients are obtained from a conditional logit fixed effects regression. The dependent variable 
in column (1) is an indicator variable that is unity if the country hosted the Olympic Games. The dependent variable in column (2) is an indicator variable 
that is unity if the country bidded to host the Olympic Games. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 













0.05** 0.21 0.26 0.11 0.94 0.26
F.BiddingCountry-
F.HostingCountry
0.13 0.07* 0.02** 0.51 0.25 0.22
F2.BiddingCountry-
F2.HostingCountry
0.02** 0.01*** 0.05** 0.08* 0.88 0.49
F3.BiddingCountry-
F3.HostingCountry
0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.48 0.05** 0.10*
F4.BiddingCountry-
F4.HostingCountry
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.01*** 0.12 0.03**
F5.BiddingCountry-
F5.HostingCountry
0.00*** 0.05** 0.01*** 0.30 0.36 0.14
F6.BiddingCountry-
F6.HostingCountry
0.69 0.42 0.97 0.59 0.38 0.48
F7.BiddingCountry-
F7.HostingCountry
0.30 0.53 0.01*** 0.81 0.68 0.71
F8.BiddingCountry-
F8.HostingCountry
0.85 0.43 0.86 0.29 0.04** 0.21
F9.BiddingCountry-
F9.HostingCountry
0.31 0.08* 0.78 0.87 0.31 0.36
F10.BiddingCountry-
F10.HostingCountry
0.98 0.41 0.32 0.83 0.09* 0.21
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The table shows the p-values on the null-hypothesis that the estimated coefficients, reported in Tables 1 and 3, are equal to zero. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 9. Cross-Country Parameter Heterogeneity
ΔLog(GDP)







































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values (reported in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 











EXPO 0.002 -0.051 -0.004 0.097 -0.037 0.029
(0.007) (0.045) (0.005) (0.071) (0.047) (0.055)
F.EXPO 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.010 -0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.027)
F2.EXPO 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.013 -0.026
(0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.038)
F3.EXPO 0.015* 0.042** 0.009 0.020 -0.016 -0.006
(0.009) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.016) (0.035)
F4.EXPO -0.000 -0.008 -0.002 -0.011 0.019 -0.077
(0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.067)
F5.EXPO 0.014 0.046 0.004 0.007 0.051 -0.072
(0.009) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.040) (0.070)
F6.EXPO 0.018** 0.029 0.018** 0.006 0.014 -0.066
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.016) (0.026) (0.053)
F7.EXPO 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.001 -0.023
(0.009) (0.027) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.033)
F8.EXPO 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.008 -0.025 0.001
(0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.039)
F9.EXPO 0.014*** 0.028 0.007 0.011 -0.027* 0.009
(0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.051)
F10.EXPO 0.015 0.058* 0.011 -0.018 -0.008 -0.027
(0.010) (0.031) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) (0.042)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 











L.EXPO  -0.006 -0.018 0.003 0.011 0.032 -0.069
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.029) (0.046)
L2.EXPO  0.005 -0.006 0.014** -0.004 0.027 -0.073
(0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.010) (0.018) (0.048)
L3.EXPO  0.008 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.010 -0.027
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.024)
L4.EXPO  -0.011 0.025 -0.008 -0.014 -0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.044) (0.007) (0.016) (0.032) (0.044)
L5.EXPO  -0.021* -0.070* -0.012* -0.016 -0.083* 0.109
(0.011) (0.037) (0.006) (0.020) (0.045) (0.076)
L6.EXPO   0.000 -0.068 -0.013 0.066 -0.057 0.201
(0.009) (0.042) (0.013) (0.054) (0.046) (0.194)
L7.EXPO   0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.021 -0.027
(0.008) (0.024) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.021)
L8.EXPO  -0.008 -0.023 0.004 -0.015 0.046** -0.068**
(0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.015) (0.023) (0.031)
L9.EXPO  -0.006 -0.026 -0.001 -0.001 -0.057 0.052
(0.006) (0.022) (0.005) (0.007) (0.046) (0.061)
L10.EXPO   0.004 -0.029 -0.008 0.063 -0.059 0.098
(0.007) (0.030) (0.010) (0.060) (0.043) (0.092)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











Panel A: Test of Difference Before Effects
H0: Effects are the same 
(p-value)
0.896 0.536 0.653 0.748 0.380 0.531
Panel B: Test of Difference Contemporaneous Effect
H0: Effects are the same 
(p-value)
0.215 0.144 0.041** 0.193 0.229 0.180
Panel B: Test of Difference After Effects
H0: Effects are the same 
(p-value)
0.353 0.340 0.386 0.312 0.414 0.656
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values (reported in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Panel A reports the p-value on the null hypothesis that the sum of the t+1 to t+10 effects of hosting the Olympics are the same as the sum of the t+1 to t+10 
effects of hosting the Expo. Panel B reports the p-value on the null hypothesis that the contemporaneous effect of hosting the Olympics is the same as the 
contemporaneous effect of hosting the Expo. Panel C reports the p-value on the null hypothesis that the sum of the t-1 to t-10 effects of hosting the 
Olympics are the same as the sum of the t-1 to t-10 effects of hosting the Expo. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 











Worldc -0.026** -0.041 -0.041* 0.009 0.018 0.033
(0.012) (0.045) (0.022) (0.010) (0.044) (0.110)
F.WorldCup -0.017** -0.076** 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.043
(0.008) (0.031) (0.019) (0.013) (0.028) (0.097)
F2.WorldCup 0.002 0.040 -0.005 0.013 0.003 0.095
(0.010) (0.029) (0.014) (0.008) (0.027) (0.132)
F3.WorldCup -0.017*** -0.035 -0.014** -0.002 -0.066 0.145
(0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.011) (0.086) (0.148)
F4.WorldCup -0.012 -0.031 -0.010 0.011 -0.074 0.008
(0.010) (0.031) (0.010) (0.013) (0.072) (0.087)
F5.WorldCup -0.009 -0.029 -0.018** 0.012 -0.019 -0.047
(0.012) (0.032) (0.008) (0.008) (0.058) (0.051)
F6.WorldCup 0.008 0.024 -0.001 0.026** 0.063 -0.113
(0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.013) (0.077) (0.126)
F7.WorldCup -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 0.031*** -0.010 -0.030
(0.014) (0.030) (0.013) (0.009) (0.023) (0.051)
F8.WorldCup -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 0.031*** 0.010 -0.194**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.096)
F9.WorldCup -0.010 -0.038 -0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.159*
(0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.012) (0.027) (0.095)
F10.WorldCup 0.002 -0.008 0.011 0.035*** -0.004 -0.143**
(0.010) (0.035) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.070)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











L.WorldCup -0.005 0.013 -0.010 0.005 0.006 0.054
(0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.031) (0.052)
L2.WorldCup -0.004 -0.012 0.017 -0.001 -0.008 0.023
(0.009) (0.047) (0.016) (0.014) (0.028) (0.064)
L3.WorldCup -0.021* -0.078*** -0.014 0.003 -0.027 -0.017
(0.012) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.033) (0.041)
L4.WorldCup 0.001 -0.059 0.031 -0.008 -0.047 0.062
(0.009) (0.060) (0.033) (0.015) (0.080) (0.125)
L5.WorldCup 0.007 0.036* -0.010 0.018 0.037 0.034
(0.008) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.089)
L6.WorldCup -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.021 0.079
(0.009) (0.024) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.121)
L7.WorldCup -0.010 -0.029 -0.021 0.025 -0.055 0.231
(0.012) (0.036) (0.023) (0.017) (0.034) (0.223)
L8.WorldCup -0.008 -0.015 0.007 -0.008 0.016 -0.127*
(0.010) (0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.026) (0.074)
L9.WorldCup -0.007 -0.052 -0.006 0.017 -0.022 0.055
(0.010) (0.045) (0.015) (0.013) (0.032) (0.068)
L10.WorldCup -0.007 -0.031 -0.002 0.008 0.012 0.071
(0.012) (0.055) (0.011) (0.014) (0.057) (0.102)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











WorldCupBid 0.003 -0.015 0.010 -0.010 0.031 0.170
(0.010) (0.024) (0.015) (0.009) (0.025) (0.228)
F.WorldCupBid 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.109
(0.008) (0.030) (0.013) (0.012) (0.026) (0.229)
F2.WorldCupBid 0.006 0.048 0.002 -0.006 0.020 0.062
(0.009) (0.030) (0.007) (0.013) (0.023) (0.186)
F3.WorldCupBid -0.003 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.022 -0.057
(0.010) (0.035) (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) (0.065)
F4.WorldCupBid -0.007 -0.017 -0.013 0.021 0.040** -0.115*
(0.009) (0.026) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.061)
F5.WorldCupBid 0.008 0.029 0.006 -0.029 0.020 0.048
(0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.040) (0.121)
F6.WorldCupBid -0.001 0.006 -0.013* 0.019* 0.012 -0.006
(0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.011) (0.039) (0.121)
F7.WorldCupBid -0.026** -0.091* -0.019 0.004 -0.072* 0.061
(0.012) (0.049) (0.013) (0.008) (0.037) (0.059)
F8.WorldCupBid 0.008 0.009 0.014 -0.005 0.006 -0.076
(0.007) (0.027) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.065)
F9.WorldCupBid -0.008 -0.015 -0.011 0.007 0.011 -0.075
(0.006) (0.025) (0.007) (0.008) (0.023) (0.099)
F10.WorldCupBid 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.018 -0.102
(0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.007) (0.029) (0.071)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 











L.WorldCupBid -0.002 0.034 -0.016 -0.020* -0.008 -0.124
(0.020) (0.045) (0.016) (0.011) (0.041) (0.079)
L2.WorldCupBid -0.010 -0.014 0.012* -0.020 -0.141 0.123
(0.014) (0.029) (0.006) (0.013) (0.191) (0.285)
L3.WorldCupBid 0.000 -0.024 0.012 0.010 0.118 -0.099
(0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.120) (0.099)
L4.WorldCupBid -0.014 -0.085*** 0.004 -0.004 0.064 -0.144
(0.010) (0.033) (0.009) (0.015) (0.099) (0.124)
L5.WorldCupBid -0.018** -0.049** -0.022** 0.004 -0.041 -0.002
(0.008) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010) (0.088) (0.103)
L6.WorldCupBid -0.004 -0.002 -0.015 0.008 0.062 -0.128
(0.007) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.040) (0.148)
L7.WorldCupBid 0.013 0.074** -0.009 -0.005 -0.012 -0.020
(0.008) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.073)
L8.WorldCupBid -0.006 -0.042 0.005 -0.009 -0.052 -0.019
(0.014) (0.038) (0.019) (0.010) (0.042) (0.114)
L9.WorldCupBid -0.001 -0.016 0.010 -0.003 0.019 -0.000
(0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.046) (0.148)
L10.WorldCupBid -0.016 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 0.135 -0.077
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014) (0.085) (0.142)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469 5469
Number of Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 17. The Contemporaneous and Before-Effects of Hosting and Bidding for the Olympics 
(US Regional Data 1963-2008)
Panel A: Hosting Country  ΔLog(GSP) Panel B:Bidding Country  ΔLog(GSP)
 HostingState 0.023*** BiddingState -0.020
(0.006) (0.019)
F.HostingState 0.016** F.BiddingState -0.049**
(0.009) (0.022)
F2.HostingState 0.012** F2.BiddingState 0.027**
(0.006) (0.011)
F3.HostingState 0.007 F3.BiddingState -0.031
(0.007) (0.026)
F4.HostingState -0.008 F4.BiddingState -0.015***
(0.011) (0.006)
F5.HostingState 0.002 F5.BiddingState 0.030***
(0.007) (0.008)
F6.HostingState 0.002 F6.BiddingState -0.092
(0.007) (0.053)
F7.HostingState -0.011 F7.BiddingState 0.021
(0.014) (0.018)
F8.HostingState -0.011 F8.BiddingState -0.098
(0.006) (0.057)
F9.HostingState -0.018 F9.BiddingState -0.056
(0.015) (0.032)
F10.HostingState 0.005 F10.BiddingState -0.017
(0.024) (0.010)
State Fixed Effects Yes State Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 2295 Observations 2295
Number of States 51 Number of States 51
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 18. The After-Effects of Hosting and Bidding for the Olympics
(US Regional Data 1963-2008)
Panel A: Hosting Country  ΔLog(GSP) Panel B:Bidding Country  Δlog(GSP)
L.HostingState  0.006 L.BiddingState 0.015
(0.005) (0.011)
L2.HostingState  0.032*** L2.BiddingState -0.021**
(0.010) (0.008)
L3.HostingState  0.018** L3.BiddingState 0.003
(0.008) (0.011)
L4.HostingState  0.005 L4.BiddingState -0.014
(0.005) (0.029)
L5.HostingState  0.004 L5.BiddingState -0.012
(0.005) (0.008)
L6.HostingState  0.009 L6.BiddingState -0.018
(0.013) (0.021)
L7.HostingState  -0.011 L7.BiddingState -0.012
(0.009) (0.016)
L8.HostingState  -0.006 L8.BiddingState 0.019
(0.012) (0.012)
L9.HostingState  -0.004 L9.BiddingState 0.002
(0.014) (0.016)
L10.HostingState  -0.001 L10.BiddingState 0.006
(0.014) (0.004)
State Fixed Effects Yes State Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 2295 Observations 2295
Number of States 51 Number of States 51
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Table 19. The Contemporaneous and Before-Effects on Stock Prices of Hosting and Bidding for the 
Olympics
Panel A: Hosting Countries Δlog(Stock Price Index) Panel B:Bidding Countries Δlog(Stock Price Index)
 HostingState 0.103* BiddingState -0.010
(0.053) (0.045)
F.HostingState -0.057 F.BiddingState 0.012
(0.064) (0.043)
F2.HostingState -0.060 F2.BiddingState 0.086*
(0.054) (0.044)
F3.HostingState 0.078 F3.BiddingState -0.006
(0.047) (0.051)
F4.HostingState 0.035 F4.BiddingState -0.012
(0.059) (0.029)
F5.HostingState 0.005 F5.BiddingState -0.062
(0.076) (0.047)
F6.HostingState -0.009 F6.BiddingState 0.007
(0.052) (0.057)
F7.HostingState 0.082 F7.BiddingState 0.021
(0.070) (0.036)
F8.HostingState 0.088* F8.BiddingState 0.077**
(0.050) (0.028)
F9.HostingState 0.073* F9.BiddingState 0.025
(0.044) (0.038)
F10.HostingState -0.027 F10.BiddingState 0.013
(0.082) (0.026)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Country Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 631 Observations 631
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, **Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Data Appendix Table 1: List of Bidding and Hosting Countries
Bidding Country Year Bidding Country  Year Hosting Country Year
Argentina 1956 Mexico 1956 Australia 1956
Argentina 1968 Mexico 1960 Australia 2000
Argentina 2004 Netherlands 1952 Austria 1964
Australia 1992 Netherlands 1992 Austria 1976
Australia 1996 Norway 1968 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1984
Australia 2006 Norway 1992 Canada 1976
Austria 1960 Poland 2006 Canada 1988
Austria 1964 Russia 1976 Finland 1952
Belgium 1960 Serbia and Montenegro 1992 France 1968
Belgium 1964 Serbia and Montenegro 1996 France 1992
Bulgaria 1992 Slovak Republic 2006 Germany 1972
Bulgaria 1994 South Africa 2004 Greece 2004
Canada 1956 Spain 1972 Italy 1956
Canada 1964 Spain 1998 Italy 1960
Canada 1968 Sweden 1964 Italy 2006
Canada 1976 Sweden 1968 Japan 1964
Canada 1996 Sweden 1972 Japan 1972
Canada 2002 Sweden 1984 Japan 1998
China 2000 Sweden 1988 Korea, Republic of 1988
Finland 1976 Sweden 1992 Mexico 1968
Finland 2006 Sweden 1994 Norway 1952
France 1968 Sweden 1998 Norway 1994
France 1992 Sweden 2002 Russia 1980
Germany 1960 Sweden 2004 Spain 1992
Germany 1992 Switzerland 1976 United States 1960
Germany 2000 Switzerland 2002 United States 1980
Greece 1996 Switzerland 2006 United States 1984
Hungary 1960 Turkey 2000 United States 1996
Italy 1952 United Kingdom 1992 United States 2002
Italy 1988 United Kingdom 1996
Italy 1992 United Kingdom 2000
Italy 1998 United States 1960
Italy 2004 United States 1964
Japan 1960 United States 1980
Japan 1968 United States 1992
Japan 1984 United States 1994
Japan 1988 United States 1998Data Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics






Log(GDP) 8.46 1.12 0.97 1.03 0.92
Log(Private Investment) 11.29 1.58 0.89 0.93 0.85
Log(Private Consumption) 12.57 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.89
Log(Government Expenditure) 11.23 1.17 0.93 0.95 0.88
Log(Price Level) 3.89 0.55 0.84 0.86 0.85
Log(Exchange  Rate) 0.81 4.87 0.97 0.94 0.98
Note: Column (1) reports the sample mean; column (2) reports the sample standard deviation; columns (3)-(5) report the AR(1) coefficient. In column (3) 
the estimated AR(1) coefficient is based on panel fixed effects least squares estimation; column (4) system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998); 
column (5) mean-group estimation (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 